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ABSTRACT 
There is a disabling avalanche of scientific production which has overtaken most 
students of the behavioral sciences. Though science is advanced by this 
production, much of it is seen to be of marginal value. This has caused some 
disenchantment among university students with psychology-based research. To 
understand the sources of this problem, several phenomena are re-examined: (a) 
the functional autonomy of research paradigms and their assumptive justifica-
tions, (b) the failure to discard them when their dysfunction interferes with inquiry 
directed to solving pressing social problems, and (c) the intersection of politics, 
academic policies, and the reward structures woven into publication and research 
networks. The challenge to university researchers, among others, that these 
conditions impose, are assessed, and suggestions for countering them are 
presented. 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'hypertrophie de la production scientifique dans les sciences du comportement 
semble avoir créé un climat de désenchantement et d'inutilité par rapport à la 
recherche. Pour comprendre cette situation, les phénomènes suivants sont 
analysés: (a) l'autonomie fonctionelle et les postulats explicatifs des schemes de 
recherche, (b) la résistance et la durabilité des modèles de recherche, (c) les 
contraintes politiques et socio-économiques de la recherche et de la publication. 
Les implications de cette situation en particulier dans les milieux académiques 
sont abordées. Des propositions et des suggestions susceptibles d'améliorer un 
développement fidèle et valide de la recherche sont présentées. 
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There has been a great deal of disenchantment in the past decade among some 
psychologists about the troubled state of investigation in their respective 
sub-disciplines. Much research gives the impression of meticulous planning and 
execution but conceals a poverty of meaning and conceptual rigour - (e.g., 
Goldman 1976; 1979; Koch, 1981; Resnikoff, Tinsley, Sperry, & Schmidt, 1978; 
Wachtel, 1980). If one restricts oneself to a consideration of the applied domains, 
the malaise is even more acute. For example, the fundamental question of which 
psychotherapies, if any, do any good by virtue of the modalities specific to their 
treatment approach still haunts that domain. "After decades of research, the 
amount of well-established, clinically relevant knowledge about psychotherapeu-
tic outcome still remains disappointingly meagre" (Frank, 1982, p. 281). This 
example, from one applied field of psychology, is not an isolated one. And we 
suspect that the deficits, distortions, and lacunae inherent to this field are related to 
an underpinning research ethic and are characteristic of the larger canvas of 
investigative and scientific activity in the behavioural sciences. 
It is not that insufficient research is being done - it can be argued that too much 
is being done. Rather, it is that the wrong kind of research is being done. The 
researchers' plaint that their findings "have not impacted sufficiently on the 
practitioner or on the policy maker" (Parloff, 1979) should be expressed with relief 
rather than regret, for we have little certitude that the floods of research directed 
towards the public, but rarely reaching it, truly speak to society's needs and well-
being. They may simply speak to the apparent futility of meeting those needs with 
the paradigms at our disposal. Rather than pursue the ever-receding goals of a 
troubled society with "more-of-the-same" research, it would be to our advantage 
to examine the cognitive and social structures that have locked us into futile 
patterns of investigation. 
Secondary Schools in North America 
The arguments developed in the rest of this paper can be applied to numerous, in 
some cases all, scientific disciplines, but we will restrict our focus for the purposes 
of this paper to the field of educational psychology. And as a backdrop for an 
examination of the constraints which operate there, it may be useful, by way of 
example, to look at one area of major concern - our North American 
secondary-school systems - and to explicitate some of the presuppositions that 
shape our problem-solving there. 
The evolution of mankind over millions of years has left it, heretofore, 
admirably equipped to extract a living from the crust of this planet and to protect 
itself from the assault of the elements as well as from its natural enemies. The 
human organism with its adaptive intellective and psychomotoric capabilities has 
indeed thrived as it has asserted its mastery over the earth and all infra-human 
species (with some notable exceptions like the cockroach, for example, and a host 
of microorganisms). 
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If we simply reflect on the history of human beings in North America, for 
example, over the past few centuries, we readily conclude that the qualities that 
were needed to forge the modern states of Canada and the United States are not 
those needed in 1983. The stamina, the muscular robustness, the physical vigor, 
the psychomotor and sensory resources, (as well as an informed pragmatism) 
necessary to build transcontinental railroads, brings forestlands under cultivation, 
build cities, highways, dams, and levees, and the massive infrastructure of an 
industrial society are no longer what is needed. The adolescent grandchildren of 
the people who accomplished these feats are now sitting in classrooms, relatively 
immobilized for hours on end, pushing pencils, turning pages, and manipulating 
nothing more resistant than the keys of a personal computer. History has played a 
nasty trick on legions of these children, many of them stigmatized in this sedentary 
environment as temperamentally difficult and "hyperactive". Are they not youths 
who would have been the restless, tireless pioneers, trailblazers, voyageurs, 
sodbusters, and cattlemen of yesteryear? Those near-adults seem the natural 
roleplayers for the legends and sagas which are part of the historical fabric of our 
societies. They now sit during the vibrant, expansive, exuberant years of their 
adolescence, dysphoric, counting the minutes until they can leave the confinement 
of their classrooms and run out onto the ballfield - or do anything that allows them 
to use the resources of their bodies in a more balanced mix with the resources of 
their minds. This is the backdrop for one of the tragedies of contemporary 
education, tragedy by virtue of its debilitating impact on the psychosocial 
development of the adolescent, and by virtue of the large numbers afflicted. 
The assumption that universal secondary education is not only an ideological 
desideratum but that cognitive access to anything taught in our high schools is a 
real possibility for anyone who wishes it, is regnant and inviolable. That 
double assumption needs to be re-examined as does the "associationist" learning 
paradigm which is its bulwark. We have convinced our adolescents (and their 
parents) that success in life is predicated on a good high school education. But for 
innumerable reasons that have nothing to do with teaching methods, we are still 
not sure that the minimum intellectual demands fall within the capability of many 
of them at the time that they are exposed to it. Hundreds of thousands of youngsters 
are dropouts from high schools, not only because that institutional ambience is not 
temperamentally congenial to them, but because, given their individual develop-
mental schedules, they do not have the cognitive ability to succeed there. There is 
a remarkable asynchrony between the cognitive tasks they are asked to perform 
and their cognitive readiness to address themselves to such tasks. 
Karplus and Peterson (1970) did a remarkable study which involved testing 727 
students from suburban and inner-city schools on their use of proportional 
reasoning in arithmetic. They found that 94% of the suburban children they tested 
did not reason proportionally in grade six; 68% did not in grades eight through ten; 
and 20% did not in grades eleven and twelve. The corresponding figures for 
inner-city areas were more disturbing: in grades eight through ten 95% did not 
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reason with proportions, and 91% did not do so in their last two years of high 
school. The investigators arrived at these results by giving the children a problem 
in proportional thinking (using buttons and paper clips for measuring stick figures) 
that assessed skills characteristic of those required in certain curricula of the 
secondary school. These findings are by no means unique (e.g., Wollman & 
Karplus, 1974; Chapman, 1975). 
This is an important matter since the ability to use such reasoning is critical to 
success not only in mathematics but in other scientific disciplines. And given its 
cognitive relatedness to analogic thinking, there are few areas in the typical high 
school curriculum that do not require rather sophisticated levels of this ability for 
success. There are, of course, other formal operations such as Linnaean-style 
classifications, the construction of hypotheses, combinatorial strategies, and 
innumerable logical principles which, if one cannot use them, at least in an 
inchoate way, will ensure that high school proves to be a series of failure 
experiences and a torment without end. 
The reasons for deficits in these areas are complex (Chapman, 1975); they are 
maturational, socio-economic, genetic, nutritional-medical. But no matter what 
the cause, a massive social operation such as a secondary school education system 
that forces children into our procrustean "curriculum and instruction" beds can 
only be the cause of significant levels of failure. The interesting and disturbing 
feature in this is less in the fact that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
adolescent children in North America lack the essential cognitive skills to 
understand the material delivered in their classes; it is more in the fact that they are 
spending years of their young lives "learning" that they cannot learn, that they are 
hopelessly incompetent in the domains that a dominant culture has convinced them 
are absolutely necessary to success. The subjective experience of spending 
hundreds of hours in classes where the content of the instruction is literally 
incomprehensible to them can, over the years, only be damaging to them. They 
while away those precious hours ruminating of ways to salvage some few shreds of 
self-respect. Even dropping out and pumping gas can be an appealing, if not 
irresistible, prospect by comparison with the numbing experience of incessant, 
unrelieved failure and boredom. 
This has long had the earmarks of a tragedy of epidemic and vast proportions, 
one of our own making and, given our assumptions, a tragedy, we believe, without 
solution. Given a political credo which affirms not simply that everyone has the 
right to a secondary school education such as it exists, but that everyone has 
potential cognitive access to every discipline regardless of the cognitive processes 
that underpin its exercise, a question needs to be answered: what provision are we 
making for the millions of adolescents who do not fit our assumptions? 
There are many and complex reasons for explaining the stability of educational 
and other social institutions that have reached critical levels of dysfunction. The 
assumptions and paradigms which underpin them remain unshaken even when the 
anomalies and counterindications multiply at an accelerating rate. The paradoxical 
aspect of this is that scientific research more often than not advances the 
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misconceptions which promote the continuation of our problems. Some of the 
reasons for this are principally psychological, rooted in the inherent conservatism 
of all disciplines. Others are exquisitely political, determined by more or less 
stable institutional structures, regional as well as national, representing entrenched 
ideologies. The following sections of this paper provide a re-examination of these 
issues and the underpinning paradigms which frustrate their resolution. Let us look 
first at perseveration in superannuated paradigms. 
Disciplines and Functional Autonomy 
Feyerabend (1970) has promoted the notion that a theory should be retained "even 
if there are data which are inconsistent with it" (p. 203). He has called this notion 
the principle of tenacity. Theories, he affirms, are capable of development. They 
can be improved, and "they can eventually be able to accommodate the very same 
difficulties they were incapable of explaining" (p. 204). This, it seems, is the 
perennial hope of every theoretician and scientist whose professional life is deeply 
involved with a theory in 'Big Trouble'. 
The human animal, not excluding the scientist, is an inveterate proselytizer. He 
is not content simply to discover the "truth". He feels a compulsion to disseminate 
it (else why must he cry out his "Eurekas" to the world). Further, he seems 
distressed when others do not share his belief in it. He is not less distressed, it 
seems, when he is propagating, not a scientific discovery, but a theoretical 
paradigm. François Jacob (cited in Monod, 1971, p. 20), a Nobel laureate in 
biology, said, "The dream of every cell is to become two cells". The dream of 
every researcher, we theorize, is to recruit, to become two, four, eight of himself 
or herself. It is a cloning propensity that is given ample scope for actualization in 
educational psychology as in other scientific fields. 
Once a major theory has become entrenched and has a committed cohort of 
adherents, it is only able to be disestablished with great difficulty, if at all. When a 
scientist or a professional has invested 10 or 15 years of his life in a belief system, 
and he has, in effect, come to regard the assumptions of that system as laws of 
nature, he cannot easily be convinced that he has been in error (Boring, 1964). In 
matters of little importance if adaptive responses of individuals continue long after 
they have ceased serving a useful purpose, they are simply considered quirks. But 
it is not a laughing matter when professions founded on science perpetuate 
discredited notions. Perseverating in obsolete practices is known to have occurred, 
and continues to be evident, in the helping professions - with great harm to those 
who have sought help as clients, patients, students (cf. Koch, 1980). 
Relative to this issue, Max Planck (1949) stated that "a new scientific truth does 
not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather 
because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar 
with it" (pp. 33-34). A corollary of this is that proponents of an old doctrine do not 
abandon it by admitting the validity of their adversaries' criticisms. Depending on 
their level of commitment to it - and in any case there are wide individual 
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differences in the cognitive flexibility of everyone involved - they either entrench 
themselves more deeply or they begin to make gradual, almost imperceptible shifts 
toward the position of their rivals (Birk & Brinkley-Birk, 1974). 
The field of medicine provides many examples of the above, and some with 
tragic consequences. One of the most instructive for all professionals revolves 
about the 19th century figure of Ignaz Semmelweiss, patron saint of modern 
infection control practitioners. Semmelweiss, a Viennese physician, is renowned 
for his investigations of the high levels of infant and maternal mortality that 
prevailed in the hospitals of that city. He observed that parturient women were 
getting infected in the hospital and dying at rates that stupefied him. His research in 
the matter led him to the conviction that the incidence of these puerperal diseases 
was correlated with the practice in which physicians went directly from autopsy 
rooms and other centers of contagion into the maternity wards, without washing 
their hands. He was fiercely attacked by his fellow-physicians for propagating 
these findings. This pioneer in antiseptic procedure, tormented by the continuing 
high deathrates of childbearing women, slid into mental illness from which he 
never recovered. It was only after a prolonged struggle within the medical 
establishment and the compelling studies of Lister that basic antiseptic procedure 
became accepted, and the norm. 
Rachman and Wilson (1980) have recounted for us the "cautionary tale of the 
rise and fall of insulin therapy" (pp. 13-16). This "misguided therapy" disappeared 
from the psychiatric scene in the '60s not, apparently, because it was admitted to 
be ineffective, which it evidently is, but because a generation of powerful 
psychotropic drugs - principally the tranquillizers - were seen to be more 
effective. 
The disquieting feature of this history is that insulin coma "therapy", per se, was 
never adequately demonstrated to be of help in the treatment of schizophrenia 
(Kalinowski & Hippius, 1969), although it had been demonstrated to have 
deleterious side effects. Nevertheless, it was used by medical practitioners and 
promoted by scholars, all of whom, presumably, had undergone rigorous and 
scientific training. The failure to apply the principles of scientific evaluation to our 
own remedies, on the one hand, and on the other the refusal to acknowledge the 
cogent and powerful criticisms of those who have tested those remedies, 
demonstrated once again how difficult it is to separate indoctrinated scientists and 
professionals from their mindsets and habitual practices. The praxis and theory of 
professionals form belief systems and as such, even when: they become 
superannuated they do not die, they just fade away. 
Relative to the principle of tenacity elaborated by Feyerabend, neither educators 
nor psychologists need to be exhorted to embrace this principle. This is analogous 
to training monkeys to climb trees. There has always been altogether too much of 
this going on. As Lakatos (1970) put it, "Given sufficient imagination, any 
theory... can be permanently saved from refutation by some suitable adjustment in 
the background knowledge in which it is embedded" (p. 184). This is another 
expression of the Duhem-Quine thesis : in the face of incontrovertible evidence that 
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appears to discredit a system one can (and is inclined to) continue to make 
adjustments in it, at least to the extent necessary to save it from absurdity. 
A similar observation has been provided by Watzlawick (1976, pp. 49-51). In 
discussing a noncontingent-reward experiment conducted by Bavelas, he conclud-
ed "that once a tentative explanation has taken hold of our minds, information to 
the contrary may produce, not corrections" but a more and more complex and 
elaborated explanation. The explanation becomes self-sealing and irrefutable no 
matter how groundless it is. "Intellectual honesty does not consist in trying to 
entrench or establish one's position by proving (or probabilifying) it.. .intellectual 
honesty consists rather in specifying precisely the conditions under which one is 
willing to give up one's position" (Lakatos, 1970, p. 92) and try something 
different. If, for example, Freud and orthodox Freudians had spent less time 
excommunicating dissidents and otherwise protecting their system from change, 
more time, in short, trying to disconfirm their tenets, the psychotherapeutic 
enterprise might be more advanced than it is at present. 
Research normally arises in the context of perceived contemporary needs. As 
needs change, pressure correspondingly builds up to change research priorities. 
Unfortunately scientists, still less practitioners and educators, do not respond with 
alacrity except within the constraints of their own ideological premises (e.g., 
Mahoney, 1976, pp. 116-117). The shifts in research resources necessitated by 
need and problem shifts entail organizational and logistical difficulties which are 
barely manageable in modern democratic societies. But as Shadish (1984) has 
cogently argued, research which is not in synchrony with contemporary political 
and ideological trends still needs to be done if only so that broadscale innovations 
can be implemented should a favorable and unanticipated opportunity present 
itself. The alternative to this is that one is "constrained to work within the flaws of 
existing structures and ideologies, searching mostly for incremental, technical 
changes (p. 735)". This point leads to a consideration of some political realities 
and the kinds of research it promotes. 
The Politics of Research 
The notion that most scientific research is a highly politicized endeavor is widely 
accepted. Among the more modern and cogent statements of that principle is that 
of Karl Mannheim (1936) who argued that no idea is impervious to the ideological 
currents prevalent in the society in which it has arisen. A good contemporary but 
tendentious treatment of the problems arising from the socio-political matrix of 
science is that of Knorr-Cetina (1981). She rehearsed the argument that the 
discovery of principles in science is distinct from the process of validating those 
principles. The community of our peers is, alone, the entity that can turn the most 
brilliant of discoveries into acceptable ones, if not resounding ones. "If we look at 
the process of knowledge production in sufficient detail", she states, "it turns out 
that scientists constantly relate their decisions...to the expected response of 
specific members of this community of validators or to the dictates of the journal in 
which they wish to publish" (p. 7). However, the scholars who innovate are among 
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the scholars who validate. Since they form communities whose principal public 
behavior is the communication of their own ideas, one can sense how complex and 
political is this influencing process. It resembles vast, fluid, constantly shifting 
magnetic fields. 
Let us consider for a moment, on a macro-level, the political implications of the 
choice of a research problem, a choice which, far more than ability or native 
intelligence, would appear to separate out the unsuccessful researchers from the 
successful ones. Although the political engines of research are always turning, it is 
in times of social and political turmoil that they take on visibility and high relief. 
We are working in such times. A perusal of issues of the American Psychological 
Association's (APA) Monitor of recent years alone can demonstrate the 
preoccupation of the psychological community with sources of funding, especially 
federal funding. One finds innumerable allusions to the changing priorities of the 
public agencies that support private research, as well as the priorities of the 
ideologies that prevail in those agencies. 
Without excessively laboring this point, let us draw attention to an article by 
Richard Weinstein in the January, 1982 issue of the APA Monitor. His reportage 
bore on presentations made to an annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society by 
representatives of eight federal agencies that provide research funding in the 
behavioral sciences. The crux of the problem addressed was that agency budgets 
for funding are in part determined by the amount of money applied for in previous 
years. But if the perception of social scientists, for example, is that an incumbent 
administration does not favor the kinds of social programs that their studies in 
reality are promoting, they may be loath to invest time applying for funding for 
such studies. The likelihood of their labors being rewarded by the granting of funds 
will be perceived to have declined to the point where the investment seems to be a 
poor one. The upshot of this is that the number of research proposals submitted will 
decline, justifying a future retrenchment of available funds. This, in turn, further 
reduces interest in applying for funds. 
James Scheier of the (U.S.) National Institute of Mental Health warned that 
inasmuch as research proposals addressed to that agency had declined recently by 
two-thirds, that would entail, in all probability, deeper cuts in the allocation of 
funds in the future (Weinstein, 1982). A similar trend was made evident in other 
agencies. A recommendation, therefore, that emanated from this sombre backdrop 
was that a continuing stream of applications should be directed to any agencies 
whose public policy objectives were roughly consistent with the research interests 
of the applicants. It was further recommended that one send the same proposal, 
suitably "adjusted", to several agencies more or less interested in one's field of 
study. 
What are the implications of this advice to chase dwindling funds, to be granted 
on the basis of rapidly shifting criteria of social need, with more numerous and 
heftier applications? From an actuarial point of view, the probability rises that a 
much larger absolute number of applications will be turned down. And the 
probability also rises that those who see themselves as junior or "second-line" 
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rather than senior or "first-line" researchers, and less well connected than some of 
their colleagues, will not invest several months of hard work in developing 
proposals whose underlying rationale is, in part, to enhance future funding that 
will be garnered in great likelihood by better established scholars and researchers. 
As one wag has put it, this is the academic analogue of Amway. At the bottom of a 
pyramid of proposal generators is a host of junior academics "beavering away" on 
proposals that will have as their principal function increasing funding for better 
established centers and researchers. 
The competition for research funding exacts a heavy toll from grant proposal 
developers. First, they may need, at times, to modify their interests so that they fall 
under the rubric, "hot research subjects". If considerations of professional 
advancement override the meanderings of their scientific curiosity, they may have 
to change their tack, say, to defense related subjects or to bilingual education. In 
many cases this might involve more than minor adaptations in their research 
trajectories. They will be tempted, further, to design a multi-purpose proposal 
such that, should it fail to gain funding, a monograph or several review articles can 
be chunked out of it. 
Second, publication strategies and the ideological preferences of the research 
network that may vet one's manuscripts and proposals are potent factors in 
determining the shape of the underpinning research objectives and designs. Many 
of our colleagues are not disposed to act favorably on scholarship that questions the 
conventional wisdom of their field. And government agencies on the other hand, 
resist underwriting hypotheses that challenge, even implicitly, the convictions and 
values of their constituencies. The recent turbulence we witnessed relative to a 
new managerial style in the (U.S.) National Institute of Education and the 
revamping of its research agendas (Mervis, 1982) clearly illustrate what has 
always been the case: science and research are inherently and pervasively 
ideologized. Although we can complain that traditional peer review procedures 
have been drastically altered, and that agendas have been distorted, the historical 
reality is that politics and social context have always, directly or indirectly, been 
the prepotent determinants of the kinds of science that we busy ourselves with, and 
these are in constant change. 
Third, the development of research proposals has become an increasingly 
demanding art for a number of reasons. Knorr-Cetina (1981) states that research 
teams learn the art of dissimulation, for they often sense the need to conceal their 
ideas from peer reviewers, particularly those who are their "most dangerous 
competitors in the area" (p. 87). She adduces evidence to support a graver concern: 
a competitor who is reviewing another's proposal can delay forwarding his 
assessment in order to have had the time to cull out useful ideas for himself and 
gain some time in advancing a more competitive proposal of his own. Aside from 
the consideration that this tactic is less than virtuous and militates against some 
treasured canons of scientific inquiry, grant proposal developers must use 
language that is sufficiently explicit and concrete so that their projects are 
comprehensible and compelling should they be sent by chance to reviewers who 
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are less familiar with the subspecialization in question than they are. 
Beyond that, this process can be very time-consuming. Academics can allocate 
more time to the development of proposals, steering them in and through the 
granting machinery, and renewing them yearly, than they spend on the research 
itself. Comparing this allocation of time and energy to expenditures on actual 
research, class preparation, and other non-grant seeking activities illumines the 
distortions in the distribution of resources that can compromise the educative 
functions of the university. 
Toward the micro-end of a continuum of analysis, it is interesting to look at the 
university context within which some scientists work. Academics are no longer 
simply salaried employees of a university. Increasingly, they have been given to 
understand that they have entrepreneurial responsibilities of a major magnitude. 
Not only must they do science, they must garner their own funding for it. If 30% to 
60% of each grant dollar is sequestered by the university comptroller, it is evident 
that the university is not just recouping the direct and indirect costs to it of having 
research done within its premises. Those funds like general revenues are used in 
part to defray the normal operational expenses of running such an institution. 
The implicit job description of contemporary academic staff includes, as a 
major component, fund-raising. And fund-raising, largely through promotional 
work involved in grant procurement, requires levels of political skill and 
salesmanship, entrepreneurial drive, and administrative acumen, that lie far 
beyond the competencies, and usually the interests, of academics. "Hustling the 
research dollar" can be extremely time-consuming. For many it is a potent 
distractor from their research and teaching responsibilites. 
This complex of discordant responsibilities so acutely felt by many academics 
does not figure to the same extent in the professional lives of researchers working 
for private laboratories or for government departments. A comparative study of the 
parallel and divergent responsibilities of researchers working in these various 
settings would be useful. It would illumine, we would think, the relative efficiency 
with which each of these organizational models promotes creative and truly 
productive research. 
The Molecularisation and Hypertrophy of Knowledge 
The reward structures and constraints described in the previous pages have 
provoked their own peculiar anomalies in the massive research production of the 
past few decades. Countless researchers spend their lives chipping away at tiny 
problems which have meaning only within the dominant paradigms of their 
disciplines. In the numerous domains that constitute psychology there are few 
paradigms that find general acceptance. Much of the problem-solving, therefore, 
is of an ad hoc and even whimsical nature, unrelated in a coherent fashion with any 
paradigm that can give it meaning as science. There may be nothing intrinsically 
wrong with any one of these studies. The problem develops when a field is 
top-heavy with such studies and their authors are not asking the broader questions 
that give meaning to them all. 
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A different research attitude consists in striving to gain a broad perspective on a 
larger field of inquiry, one that can eliminate thousands of studies of a patchwork, 
trial-and-error, evolutionary kind. An exemplary model for that broader approach 
is Subrahayam Chandrasekhar who has labored a lifetime in the area of 
astrophysics. He wrote a tract in the '60s on ellipsoids (1969), a rather 
unfashionable subject in his field at that time. He has told us that the reason for 
writing that tract was that previous research had left the subject "with many gaps 
and omissions and some plain errors and misconceptions. It seemed a pity", he 
stated, "that it should be allowed to remain in this destitute state" (Tierney, 1982). 
Chandrasekhar systematically analyzed the total problem of the rotating ellipsoid 
and brought order to a domain of inquiry that was heretofore filled with un-
coordinated and faulty answers to a host of uncoordinaed questions. 
This research effort of several years did not yield a product that could easily be 
contained in a 10-page journal article. It had the further liability that it did not seem 
to have any immediate relevance to the major questions the field was addressing 
itself to. Despite its apparent marginality, the tract is beginning to be seen as an 
extremely valuable synthesis of a field, having applicability that was not imagined 
a few short years ago. 
"If you make a sculpture", says Chandrasekhar, "you don't want to go on 
chipping it here and there". This research philosophy seems to be needed in our 
own domains. We have been bringing single bricks to research edifices which are 
still in a pre-paradigmatic stage. We suppose, as Goldman (1976) has suggested, 
that the well-executed survey article can serve to give coherence and direction to 
our work. But it is inadequate for providing the coordination of a well-executed 
paradigm. Nor can it, except in rare instances, make sense out of a pattern of 
research activity that was conducted in molecular fashion and which lacked the 
direction and vision which has characterized the work of, say, Bandura, or Super, 
or Thomas and Chess, or Maccoby. The highly molecularized nature of our work 
cannot be explained, as it can in physics and other hard sciences, by the existence 
of widely accepted paradigms - for we have few. We engage in bits-and-pieces 
operations because there are lacking the overarching directive principles which 
might give meaning and coherence to longer-term projects. 
There are structural constraints other than those noted above that have provoked 
their own peculiar anomalies in the massive "research" production of the past few 
decades. The reward structures in contemporary North American academia are not 
the least of these influences. The exigencies of promotion and tenure regulations 
have impelled legions of professor-researchers to publish several articles a year 
(each of which may be hardly distinguishable from the others) without regard to 
their alleged intrinsic importance. This has contributed to the proliferation of tens 
of thousands of snippets of research which are non-programmatic or otherwise 
uncoordinated in character. 
We are not, on the other hand, making a plea for psychological and educational 
researchers to write the periodic book. Indeed, books are becoming increasingly 
an anachronism in this scientific age. As Kuhn (1969) pointed out over 20 years 
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ago, books are largely either "texts or retrospective reflections" (p. 20). And we 
would think that their general usefulness declines in rough proportion to the 
decline in the half-life of the discipline of which they are an exposition. On the 
other hand, myriad journal articles pass through our intellectual universe like so 
many unconnected asteroids. We cannot keep track of them, or even for that matter 
take note of most of them, relevant as they may be to our work. Unless they have a 
seminal character they become immemorable. We are reaching the human limits 
of what we can be aware exists, let alone speak of assimilating it. When one 
recognizes the tens of thousands of articles that are published each year in one or 
another social science, the problem looks like a terminal disease. 
The eminent historian of science, Derek DeSolla Price (1982), said that "in 
science we are at the stage where it is often easier to do an experiment over again 
than try to find it in the published literature". As science has continued its 
exponential growth we have tended increasingly to miss things and to lose things. 
"The structure of science has been threatened with a sort of dry rot from within, 
owing to sheer human limitations" (p. 96). Knorr-Cetina (1981) quotes a scientist 
who gives a similar perspective on the same difficulty. She states that "there is a 
certain...high percentage...maybe...40% of (the published material) I ask for 
which I never get The authors don't send you a reprint, the library can't get it -
for one reason or another, I don't receive it" (p. 37). This researcher may not have 
reflected on it but she has been unfortunate, further, in that she has lacked 
countless other references of greater value, perhaps, than the one she couldn't 
track down. 
This situation poignantly presents us with the Baconian challenge: "Truth 
emerges more readily from error than from confusion". With the hypertrophy of 
knowledge and data-bases that even the most specialized of social sciences is 
presented, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish errors and irrelevancies 
from their opposites. The Babel of subdisciplines creates an ambience at least as 
confusing as attending a congress whose principal language one doesn't 
understand (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, p. 37). The result of the absence of broader, 
more directive paradigms for giving us perspective on our field is to leave us with 
warehouses full of odds-and-ends. The chances of any one of them being used is 
diminishing, for even when computer searches could ferret it out, it may hardly 
occur to anyone that it exists, or believing it to exist that one has the time to 
examine it. 
Curvilinearity and Common Sense 
Yalom (1980) has stated that "paradigms are self-created, wafer-thin barriers 
against the pain of uncertainty" (p. 26). That may be so, but they afford us the 
luxury of being in error rather than floundering in chaos. And to evoke the dictum 
of Francis Bacon once more, it is easier to restructure a paradigm than correct 
myriads of answers to so many uncoordinated questions. Moving from confusion 
to error is no small step in moving toward the truth, "scientific" or other. 
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We suggested above that there are some potent political and institutional 
constraints (as well as more purely psychological ones) within which our 
problem-solving is habitually done. The state of our public education systems 
reflects the baneful influence of these constraints as well as the need to take a 
metaperspective on their components in the manner (if not with the virtuosity) of a 
Chandrasekhar, or an Alfred Adler, or a Bandura. 
We began this article with an example of a largescale institutional problem 
which is highly resistant to the remedies we have at hand. It may be useful to close 
this presentation with a look at a smaller, theoretical, more manageable domain -
personology, though others could serve our purpose. Consistent with what has 
been said above, we suggest the need to formulate personological principles in 
more holistic, paradigmatic terms. 
An example. The celebrated Yerkes-Dodson Law was formulated years ago to 
define the relationship that exists between performance levels on discrimination 
learning tasks of varying degrees of difficulty and, on the other hand, anxiety or 
drive state. The data curves describing the relationships are U-shaped. We have 
always been puzzled by the importance accorded in textbooks to the nonlinear 
character of this particular curve. And we have been surprised, but less often, by 
the surprise of researchers who proclaim in "Eureka-tones" that they have found 
yet another J-curve or U-curve describing the relationship between some 
personological variable and a certain behavior. 
We have a hunch that it is the rare personological variable that is not related in a 
non-linear way with performance variables with which it has an inherent 
relationship. As long as one is dealing with organisms which admit of only narrow 
bands of tolerance for stimulation, whether intro- or exteroceptive, one will get 
optimal performance only within that band. Outside of it, depending how 
conservatively it is defined, one gets more or less rapid falling off of performance. 
That is as true of such a simple behavior as breathing air, too much or too little of 
which is noxious for the breather, as the influence of such a complex variable as 
anxiety on puzzle-solving. 
In discussing this with colleagues, we asked them to enumerate some 
personological variables which we could play with. "Curiosity", "assertiveness", 
"KAE levels", "self-esteem", "perceptions of locus of control", and "conceptual 
level" came to mind. We began with "curiosity" and looked at its relationship with 
"harmony in interpersonal relations". It was a rather easy construct to push 
operationally into zones of absurdity. Little expressed curiosity about people in 
general or persons in particular, or extreme curiosity at the other end of that 
continuum, would precipitate declining levels of interpersonal harmony. In the 
former case, a sufficient interest in others could not be sustained to assure more 
than a transient contact with them. In the latter case, excessively curious behavior 
would generate a sense of invasiveness and personal prying in response to which 
one would become defensive. All of this would be modified interactively, no 
doubt, by the environmental matrix from which it emerges, as well as by a host of 
idiosyncratic variables. 
36 Florent Duraont and Conrad Lecomte 
Piaget, Gesell, and other developmentalists have pointed out that faster and 
sooner are not always better. If they are better, the range within which that may be 
true is limited. And Bruner (1964) has suggested that, in terms of lifestyle, 
maximum and optimal are conceptually quite different (p. 292). The broad 
principle which bears constant study in our view is that all human variables that are 
in an essential capacitating-performance relationship with each other need 
moderate levels of the "capacitator". This is just another way of saying that 
Aristotle's principle and explication of the Golden Mean embody a world of 
educational and psychological theory, and that much of the molecular work done 
in personality research can be simplified as much by this principle as the Galilean 
formula, S = 1/2 gt2, simplified physical dynamics in the 16th century. 
Each educational researcher in the land, we can reasonably hypothesize, going 
through the personality and ethnographic literature, could pick variables at 
random, study their interactions with one or more relevant behaviors, and 
ultimately derive a law affirming the curvilinearity of their relationships. The 
usefulness of that is not completely evident. Rather, the first task of such 
researchers would seem to be not "to go on chipping.. .here and there" but to ask 
themselves what the overarching, paradigmatic principles of their specialty are, 
and what any research endeavor they are engaged in means in that conceptual 
framework. Not only might that reduce the flow of scholarly studies to a modest 
stream, but it might redirect our substantial intellectual resources into effecting 
reforms where they are needed. 
Ratchet Effects: Asserting a Moral as a Conclusion 
Karl Popper (1962) wrote in the preface of his book, Conjectures and 
Refutations, that the fundamental thesis of that book was that we can learn from 
our mistakes. Increasingly, the problem for society is not so much learning from 
our mistakes as undoing them, for, in most realms of science, once basic findings 
have been applied, certain long term consequences result which are very difficult, 
if not virtually impossible, to undo. We are condemned to build upon our past 
errors (Ellul, 1967), doing our best to generate remedies that will be less damaging 
than the problems we are trying to eliminate. 
The ratchet effects (often technological in origin) that are most to be feared are 
those which build on political and social realities which cannot be undone without 
undoing an entire social order. We think of agricultural revolutions provoked in 
part by the widespread and intensive use of insecticides and herbicides which have 
made possible vast increases in the population of this planet, of which we have 
only seen the first surges. Building a 2-billion dollar airport too far from the wrong 
city or putting a wrecking ball to a priceless architectural monument are other 
examples. Developing an educational system, such as we discussed at the 
beginning of this presentation, with the serious faults that ramify through its very 
foundation, is still another. 
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It is difficult to do meaningful research if one does not see its relation to the 
larger issues which it will influence. For example, if we do not continually 
challenge the assumptions (whatever they may be or may become) of our 
thoroughly ideologized public school system, our efforts will not be directed to 
making structural changes but to compensating for fundamental errors. If, to be 
more specific, the educational researcher does not relate curriculum research and 
development in an enlarging cognitive universe to the latencies and surges of 
human cognitive development, not to mention the problem posed by individual 
differences, then all his work becomes simple tinkering, and his professional life a 
service to his political masters. 
Travel brochures are wont to tell us that "getting to your destination is half the 
fun". It may be that in much of scientific research, all of the fun is in getting there, 
for we have committed ourselves to the quest for continually improved means to 
reach carelessly examined ends (Merton, 1964, p. vi). It may be useful to reflect 
periodically on the idea that it has been the questioning of long-sought goals and 
the perennial testing of our most fundamental and long-accepted convictions that 
have permitted the most significant advances in human welfare and scientific 
knowledge. It takes courage as well as an intelligent vision to engage in a 
meaningful programmatic shift which is alien to one's personal professional 
history. In any event, it seems like a salubrious psychological exercise to examine 
the possibility and the need to do this once or twice in one's lifetime. 
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FOOTNOTE 
This article is an excerpt from a keynote address presented to Divison E of the American Educational 
Research Association at its annual meeting in Montreal, April 14, 1983. We are indebted to Prof. 
Robert Bracewell of McGill University for helpful comments made on an earlier draft of this 
manuscript. 
